Remarks at the U.S Embassy meeting on the Association

Honorable participants,

My perspective on this issue comes from the part of civil society that works on promoting democratic rights and regional peace and cooperation, and which wants to see Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic perspective unlocked.

Let me begin by saying that any discussion on the Association needs to start from a common understanding of two truths:

1. First, the Association is an international and domestic legal obligation that Kosovo has taken up and should start establishing. Yet it’s also important to note that this is a legal obligation undertaken under certain political assumptions and guarantees by Kosovo’s partners – namely, that Kosovo would have its international position unlocked. These two obligations (one Kosovo’s, the other of its allies) are mutually binding, can’t be separated and should unlock one another.

2. Secondly, whatever Kosovo has signed so far does not oblige it to do anything against its Constitution – as outlined in the 2015 agreement and as already established by the verdict of the Constitutional Court. 

If there is a mutual understanding between Kosovo and its partners on these two truths – and this seems to be the case - then certainly Kosovo should have no fear to initiate the process of establishing the Association and to dispel some of the political myths surrounding it.

The Association should be acceptable if it meets four basic principles.

1. The first principle is that this cannot be a new layer of executive power, only a facilitator and supporter of existing municipal and central functions. Services that currently operate informally like health and education would need to be integrated into existing municipal and central frameworks. Other services like social benefits and pensions, Serbia would be free to issue to its citizens on its own considering double-citizenship. The Association could have leeway to implement its own activities on soft sectors like culture and humanitarian work, but it should have no powers whatsoever on hard sectors like security. 

2. The second principle is that the Association should mirror the multiethnic and unitary premises of the state at the central level. The Association’s statute should apply the same rules that exist at the central level in the constitution for non-majority communities. For example, the Association’s structures (including decision-making bodies) should have guaranteed representation for non-majority communities from these municipalities, as well as require in decision-making on matters of vital interest the double-majority (2/3) of the non-majority communities living in these municipalities.

3. The third principle is that the Association should not be territorially concentrated in the north but should be Kosovo-wide. This would create an essential balance between local rule and the unitary nature of the state, while also serving primarily the interests of all Kosovo Serbs and not Belgrade.  

4. The fourth principle is that the Association’s sustainability depends on a spirit of good neighbourly relations. Therefore, the same degree of municipal cooperation and facilitation of services should be allowed between Kosovo and the Albanian community in the Presheva Valley. This is especially relevant in sectors like education, culture and economy.

If these principles are not met – namely, if the Association is foreseen to be a new layer of government as some from the Serbian List suggest; if it does not reflect the same multiethnic principles of the Constitution; if it is territorially centered in the north; and if there is no degree of mutual respect for minority rights in the region, then a challenge emerges that creates the need for a fifth principle.

There is a narrative in Kosovo that the Association would become a Republika Srpska. What risks producing a Republika Srpska are not the Association’s powers as such but their combination with the Ahtisaari Plan. The latter provided Kosovo Serbs with both central level veto rights over the majority and a high degree of municipal decentralization. Adding a new layer of government would mean that the Serbian minority would both live fully independently while also having veto power over the majority. This is not just a racist state design, it would also produce a dysfunctional state, make ethnic relations even more toxic and disrupt regional peace even further. 

Any potential demand directed towards Kosovo to exceed the Constitution and the principles outlined here would mean an admission by the international community that the Ahtisaarian model of resolving the issue of minority rights has failed. 

Which brings me to the fifth principle: If Kosovo Serbs demand a model of ethnic segregation and self-government, then it would be also within Kosovo’s right to also demand changes to the central level rights of non-majority communities – namely, the removal of veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, as well as the multiethnic nature of state identity (symbols, bilingualism, etc). This would effectively be a new way of dealing with minority rights and a new model of a state, with all the other implications it would bring. Hence, perhaps best avoided.